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Home > List all groups > Reaper, APT 37, Ricochet Chollima, ScarCruft

Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia

Permanent link APT group: Reaper, APT 37, Ricochet Chollima, ScarCruft

NamesReaper (FireEye)
TEMP.Reaper (FireEye)
APT 37 (Mandiant)
Ricochet Chollima (CrowdStrike)
ScarCruft (Kaspersky)
Cerium (Microsoft)
Group 123 (Talos)
Red Eyes (AhnLab)
Geumseong121 (ESRC)
Venus 121 (ESRC)
Hermit (Tencent)
InkySquid (Volexity)
ATK 4 (Thales)
ITG10 (IBM)
Ruby Sleet (Microsoft)
Crooked Pisces (Palo Alto)
Moldy Pisces (Palo Alto)
Osmium (Microsoft)
Opal Sleet (Microsoft)
TA-RedAnt (AhnLab)
CountryNorth Korea North Korea
SponsorState-sponsored
MotivationInformation theft and espionage
First seen2012
DescriptionSome research organizations link this group to Lazarus Group, Hidden Cobra, Labyrinth Chollima.

(FireEye) Read our report, APT37 (Reaper): The Overlooked North Korean Actor, to learn more about our assessment that this threat actor is working on behalf of the North Korean government, as well as various other details about their operations:
• Targeting: Primarily South Korea – though also Japan, Vietnam and the Middle East – in various industry verticals, including chemicals, electronics, manufacturing, aerospace, automotive, and healthcare.
• Initial Infection Tactics: Social engineering tactics tailored specifically to desired targets, strategic web compromises typical of targeted cyberespionage operations, and the use of torrent file-sharing sites to distribute malware more indiscriminately.
• Exploited Vulnerabilities: Frequent exploitation of vulnerabilities in Hangul Word Processor (HWP), as well as Adobe Flash. The group has demonstrated access to zero-day vulnerabilities (CVE-2018-0802), and the ability to incorporate them into operations.
• Command and Control Infrastructure: Compromised servers, messaging platforms, and cloud service providers to avoid detection. The group has shown increasing sophistication by improving their operational security over time.
• Malware: A diverse suite of malware for initial intrusion and exfiltration. Along with custom malware used for espionage purposes, APT37 also has access to destructive malware.
ObservedSectors: Aerospace, Automotive, Chemical, Education, Financial, Government, Healthcare, High-Tech, Manufacturing, Media, Technology, Transportation.
Countries: Cambodia, China, Czech, Hong Kong, India, Japan, Kuwait, Laos, Nepal, Poland, Romania, Russia, South Korea, Thailand, UK, USA, Vietnam.
Tools usedBLUELIGHT, CARROTBALL, CARROTBAT, Cobalt Strike, CORALDECK, DOGCALL, Dolphin, Erebus, Final1stSpy, Freenki Loader, GELCAPSULE, GOLDBACKDOOR, GreezeBackdoor, HAPPYWORK, KARAE, KevDroid, Konni, MILKDROP, N1stAgent, NavRAT, Nokki, Oceansalt, PoohMilk Loader, POORAIM, RokRAT, RICECURRY, RUHAPPY, ScarCruft, SHUTTERSPEED, SLOWDRIFT, SOUNDWAVE, Syscon, VeilShell, WINERACK, ZUMKONG and several 0-day Flash and MS Office exploits.
Operations performed2012Spying on South Korean users.
2016Operation “Erebus”
<https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/security/news/cyber-attacks/erebus-linux-ransomware-impact-to-servers-and-countermeasures>
Mar 2016Operation “Daybreak”
Target: High profile victims.
Method: Previously unknown (0-day) Adobe Flash Player exploit. It is also possible that the group deployed another zero day exploit, CVE-2016-0147, which was patched in April.
<https://securelist.com/operation-daybreak/75100/>
Note: not the same operation as DarkHotel’s Operation “Daybreak”.
Aug 2016Operation “Golden Time”
Target: South Korean users.
Method: spear-phishing emails combined with malicious HWP documents created using Hancom Hangul Office Suite
Nov 2016Operation “Evil New Year”
Target: South Korean users.
Method: spear-phishing emails combined with malicious HWP documents created using Hancom Hangul Office Suite.
Mar 2017Operation “Are You Happy?”
Target: South Korean users.
Method: Not only to gain access to the remote infected systems but to also wipe the first sectors of the device.
May 2017Operation “FreeMilk”
Target: Several non-Korean financial institutions.
Method: A malicious Microsoft Office document, a deviation from their normal use of Hancom documents.
<https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/unit42-freemilk-highly-targeted-spear-phishing-campaign/>
Nov 2017Operation “North Korean Human Right”
Target: South Korean users.
Method: Spear-phishing emails combined with malicious HWP documents created using Hancom Hangul Office Suite.
Dec 2017Operation “Fractured Block”
<https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/unit42-the-fractured-block-campaign-carrotbat-malware-used-to-deliver-malware-targeting-southeast-asia/>
Jan 2018Operation “Evil New Year 2018”
Target: South Korean users.
Method: Spear-phishing emails combined with malicious HWP documents created using Hancom Hangul Office Suite.
Mar 2018Operation “Battle Cruiser”
<https://blog.alyac.co.kr/1625>
Apr 2018Operation “Star Cruiser”
<http://blog.alyac.co.kr/1653>
May 2018Operation “Onezero”
<https://brica.de/alerts/alert/public/1215993/analysis-of-apt-attack-on-operation-onezero-conducted-as-a-document-on-panmunjom-declaration/>
Aug 2018Operation “Rocket Man”
<https://brica.de/alerts/alert/public/1226363/the-latest-apt-campaign-of-venus-121-group-operation-rocket-man/>
Nov 2018Operation “Korean Sword”
<https://brica.de/alerts/alert/public/1252896/venus-121-apt-organization-operation-high-expert/>
Jan 2019Operation “Holiday Wiper”
<https://brica.de/alerts/alert/public/1252896/venus-121-apt-organization-operation-high-expert/>
Mar 2019Operation “Golden Bird”
<https://brica.de/alerts/alert/public/1252896/venus-121-apt-organization-operation-high-expert/>
Mar 2019Operation “High Expert”
<https://brica.de/alerts/alert/public/1252896/venus-121-apt-organization-operation-high-expert/>
Apr 2019Operation “Black Banner”
<https://brica.de/alerts/alert/public/1257351/venus-121-rocketman-campaign-operation-black-banner-apt-attack/>
May 2019We recently discovered some interesting telemetry on this actor, and decided to dig deeper into ScarCruft’s recent activity. This shows that the actor is still very active and constantly trying to elaborate its attack tools. Based on our telemetry, we can reassemble ScarCruft’s binary infection procedure. It used a multi-stage binary infection to update each module effectively and evade detection.
<https://securelist.com/scarcruft-continues-to-evolve-introduces-bluetooth-harvester/90729/>
Jul 2019Operation “Fractured Statue”
<https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/the-fractured-statue-campaign-u-s-government-targeted-in-spear-phishing-attacks/>
Sep 2019Operation “Dragon messenger”
<https://blog.alyac.co.kr/attachment/[email protected]>
Jan 2020North Korean APT used VBA self decode technique to inject RokRat
<https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2021/01/retrohunting-apt37-north-korean-apt-used-vba-self-decode-technique-to-inject-rokrat/>
Mar 2020Operation “Spy Cloud”
<https://blog.alyac.co.kr/attachment/[email protected]>
Dec 2020North Korean software supply chain attack targets stock investors
<https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/north-korean-software-supply-chain-attack-targets-stock-investors/>
<https://blog.alyac.co.kr/3489>
Mar 2021ScarCruft surveilling North Korean defectors and human rights activists
<https://securelist.com/scarcruft-surveilling-north-korean-defectors-and-human-rights-activists/105074/>
Apr 2021North Korean APT InkySquid Infects Victims Using Browser Exploits
<https://www.volexity.com/blog/2021/08/17/north-korean-apt-inkysquid-infects-victims-using-browser-exploits/>
<https://www.volexity.com/blog/2021/08/24/north-korean-bluelight-special-inkysquid-deploys-rokrat/>
Apr 2021Who’s swimming in South Korean waters? Meet ScarCruft’s Dolphin
<https://www.welivesecurity.com/2022/11/30/whos-swimming-south-korean-waters-meet-scarcrufts-dolphin/>
Jul 2021New variant of Konni malware used in campaign targetting Russia
<https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-intelligence/2021/08/new-variant-of-konni-malware-used-in-campaign-targetting-russia/>
Dec 2021North Korean hackers target Russian diplomats using New Year greetings
<https://therecord.media/north-korean-hackers-attack-russian-diplomats-using-new-year-greetings/>
<https://blog.lumen.com/new-konni-campaign-targeting-russian-ministry-of-foreign-affairs/>
Jan 2022KONNI evolves into stealthier RAT
<https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-intelligence/2022/01/konni-evolves-into-stealthier-rat/>
Mar 2022The ink-stained trail of GOLDBACKDOOR
<https://stairwell.com/news/threat-research-the-ink-stained-trail-of-goldbackdoor/>
May 2022Comrades in Arms? | North Korea Compromises Sanctioned Russian Missile Engineering Company
<https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/comrades-in-arms-north-korea-compromises-sanctioned-russian-missile-engineering-company/>
Jul 2022Operation “STIFF#BIZON”
The Securonix Threat Research (STR) team has been observing and investigating a new attack campaign exploiting high-value targets, including Czech Republic, Poland, and other countries.
<https://www.securonix.com/blog/stiffbizon-detection-new-attack-campaign-observed/>
Sep 2022Meeting the “Ministrer”
<https://www.fortinet.com/blog/threat-research/konni-rat-phishing-email-deploying-malware>
Oct 2022Internet Explorer 0-day exploited by North Korean actor APT37
<https://blog.google/threat-analysis-group/internet-explorer-0-day-exploited-by-north-korean-actor-apt37/>
Jan 2023RedEyes hackers use new malware to steal data from Windows, phones
<https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/redeyes-hackers-use-new-malware-to-steal-data-from-windows-phones/>
Feb 2023HWP Malware Using the Steganography Technique: RedEyes (ScarCruft)
<https://asec.ahnlab.com/en/48063/>
Mar 2023CHM Malware Disguised as Security Email from a Korean Financial Company: Redeyes (Scarcruft)
<https://asec.ahnlab.com/en/49089/>
Apr 2023RokRAT Malware Distributed Through LNK Files (*.lnk): RedEyes (ScarCruft)
<https://asec.ahnlab.com/en/51751/>
Apr 2023ITG10 Likely Targeting South Korean Entities of Interest to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK)
<https://securityintelligence.com/posts/itg10-targeting-south-korean-entities/>
May 2023Tracking Traces of Malware Disguised as Hancom Office Document File and Being Distributed (RedEyes)
<https://asec.ahnlab.com/en/53377/>
May 2023RedEyes Group Wiretapping Individuals (APT37)
<https://asec.ahnlab.com/en/54349/>
Jul 2023Operation “STARK#MULE”
Detecting Ongoing STARK#MULE Attack Campaign Targeting Victims Using US Military Document Lures
<https://www.securonix.com/blog/detecting-ongoing-starkmule-attack-campaign-targeting-victims-using-us-military-document-lures/>
Sep 2023Distribution of Backdoor via Malicious LNK: RedEyes (ScarCruft)
<https://asec.ahnlab.com/en/56756/>
Sep 2023RedEyes (ScarCruft)’s CHM Malware Using the Topic of Fukushima Wastewater Release
<https://asec.ahnlab.com/en/56857/>
Dec 2023Distribution of Phishing Email Under the Guise of Personal Data Leak (Konni)
<https://asec.ahnlab.com/en/59763/>
Dec 2023ScarCruft | Attackers Gather Strategic Intelligence and Target Cybersecurity Professionals
<https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/a-glimpse-into-future-scarcruft-campaigns-attackers-gather-strategic-intelligence-and-target-cybersecurity-professionals/>
Aug 2024AhnLab and NCSC Release Joint Report on Microsoft Zero-Day Browser Vulnerability (CVE-2024-38178)
<https://asec.ahnlab.com/en/83877/>
Sep 2024Kimsuky-linked hackers use similar tactics to attack Russia and South Korea, researchers say
<https://therecord.media/kimsuky-north-korea-hackers-targeting-russia-south-korea>
Sep 2024Operation “SHROUDED#SLEEP”
SHROUDED#SLEEP: A Deep Dive into North Korea’s Ongoing Campaign Against Southeast Asia
<https://www.securonix.com/blog/shroudedsleep-a-deep-dive-into-north-koreas-ongoing-campaign-against-southeast-asia/>
Counter operationsDec 2019On December 27, a U.S. district court unsealed documents detailing work Microsoft has performed to disrupt cyberattacks from a threat group we call Thallium, which is believed to operate from North Korea. Our court case against Thallium, filed in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, resulted in a court order enabling Microsoft to take control of 50 domains that the group uses to conduct its operations.
<https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2019/12/30/microsoft-court-action-against-nation-state-cybercrime/>
Mar 2023The Unintentional Leak: A glimpse into the attack vectors of APT37
<https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/security-research/unintentional-leak-glimpse-attack-vectors-apt37>
Information<https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/rpt_APT37.pdf>
<https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/01/korea-in-crosshairs.html>
<https://threatpost.com/scarcruft-apt-group-used-latest-flash-zero-day-in-two-dozen-attacks/118642/>
<https://global.ahnlab.com/global/upload/download/techreport/%5BAhnLab%5D%20Red_Eyes_Hacking_Group_Report%20(1).pdf>
<https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/threat-group/guid:ebf490b366269368dda52acaf34e7d38>
<https://thorcert.notion.site/TTPs-ScarCruft-Tracking-Note-67acee42e4ba47398183db9fc7792aff>
MITRE ATT&CK<https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0067/>
Playbook<https://pan-unit42.github.io/playbook_viewer/?pb=crooked-pisces>
<https://pan-unit42.github.io/playbook_viewer/?pb=moldypisces>

Last change to this card: 24 October 2024

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