
| Names | Tiny Spider (CrowdStrike) | |
| Country | [Unknown] | |
| Motivation | Financial crime | |
| First seen | 2015 | |
| Description | (ForcePoint) It all starts with the delivery of a small loader called TinyLoader, an obfuscated executable withsimple–yet powerful –downloader functionality. Upon execution, it will first brute force its own decryption key (a 32-bit value, meaning this takes a fraction of second on modern PCs) before using this to decrypt the main program code. The core functionality of the decrypted code is communication with a set of hardcoded C2 servers by IP and port. If the C2 is active, it will provide what is effectively a piece of shellcode, encrypted by another 32-bit constant. This shellcode is not ‘fire and forget’: it instead sees the loader establish a semi-interactive two-way communication with the C2. Note that the earliest traits and mentions of TinyLoader go back to as far as 2015. | |
| Observed | Sectors: Retail. Countries: Worldwide. | |
| Tools used | PinkKite, PsExec, TinyPOS, TinyLoader. | |
| Operations performed | 2017 | A new family of point-of-sale malware, dubbed PinkKite, has been identified by researchers who say the malware is tiny in size, but can delivered a hefty blow to POS endpoints. <https://threatpost.com/new-pos-malware-pinkkite-takes-flight/130428/> |
| Information | <https://www.forcepoint.com/sites/default/files/resources/files/report-tinypos-analysis-en.pdf> | |
Last change to this card: 14 April 2020
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