
| Names | Deadglyph | |
| Category | Malware | |
| Type | Backdoor | |
| Description | (ESET) Deadglyph’s loading chain consists of multiple components, as illustrated in Figure 3. The initial component is a registry shellcode loader, which loads shellcode from the registry. This extracted shellcode, in turn, loads the native x64 part of the backdoor – the Executor. The Executor subsequently loads the .NET part of the backdoor – the Orchestrator. Notably, the only component on system’s disk as a file is the initial component, which is in the form of a Dynamic Link Library (DLL). The remaining components are encrypted and stored within a binary registry value. | |
| Information | <https://www.welivesecurity.com/en/eset-research/stealth-falcon-preying-middle-eastern-skies-deadglyph/> | |
Last change to this tool card: 12 October 2023
Download this tool card in JSON format
| Changed | Name | Country | Observed | ||
APT groups | |||||
| Stealth Falcon, FruityArmor | 2012-Mar 2025 | ||||
1 group listed (1 APT, 0 other, 0 unknown)
|
Digital Service Security Center Follow us on |
Report incidents |
|
| +66 (0)2-123-1227 | ||
| [email protected] | ||