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สำนักงานพัฒนาธุรกรรมทางอิเล็กทรอนิกส์ Electronic Transactions Development Agency |
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สำนักงานพัฒนาธุรกรรมทางอิเล็กทรอนิกส์ Electronic Transactions Development Agency |
Tool: VEILEDSIGNAL| Names | VEILEDSIGNAL | |
| Category | Malware | |
| Type | Backdoor | |
| Description | (Mandiant) SIGFLIP and DAVESHELL extract and execute a modular backdoor, VEILEDSIGNAL, and two corresponding modules. VEILEDSIGNAL relies on the two extracted modules for process injection and communications with the Command and Control (C2) server. VEILEDSIGNAL and the accompanying two components provide the following functionality: • The VEILEDSIGNAL backdoor supports three commands: send implant data, execute shellcode, and terminate itself. • The process injection module injects the C2 module in the first found process instance of Chrome, Firefox, or Edge. It also monitors the named pipe and reinjects the communication module if necessary. • The C2 module creates a Windows named pipe and listens for incoming communications, which it then sends to the C2 server encrypted with AES-256 in Galois Counter Mode (GCM). | |
| Information | <https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/3cx-software-supply-chain-compromise> | |
| Malpedia | <https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.veiledsignal> | |
Last change to this tool card: 13 October 2023
Download this tool card in JSON format
| Changed | Name | Country | Observed | ||
APT groups | |||||
 | Lazarus Group, Hidden Cobra, Labyrinth Chollima |  | 2007-Sep 2024  |  | |
1 group listed (1 APT, 0 other, 0 unknown)
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